In the foregoing chapters I sought to trace a series of speculative constellations capable of undoing the subordination of the problem of individuation to its Kantian matrix, with the aim of drawing out the ontological consequences of the paradoxical encounter with the problem of life that had beset Kant in the Critique of Judgment. Through this treatment of Kant's own unfinished work, of Whitehead's philosophy of the organism, of Nietzsche's critique of teleology, of Peirce's theory of habit and of Simondon's relational account of ontogenesis, we have accumulated some of the ingredients for an alternative model of individuation. On this basis we have begun to discern how the question of the organic might no longer elicit a merely regulative solution, opening up instead onto a philosophy of production concerned with the inquiry into the preindividual sources of individuality, or better, into relations and operations that account for the individuated without presupposing it in turn. As Nietzsche's critical reflections made so forcefully clear, one of the principal tasks in this respect is that of contesting the de jure dominance of a philosophy of identity and representation over an inquiry into the morphogenesis of beings and the genesis of the intellect. Thus, it was in order to designate a counter-tradition within the philosophy ofindividuation founded on the reversal of this primacy, that I referred, somewhat barbarously, to an ontology of anomalous individuation.