Von Freytag draws an ontological distinction between ontologically concrete and ontologically abstract things.¹ According to his usage of language, entities are ontologically concrete when they enjoy an independent manner of being; what has no independent being is ontologically abstract. Everything which is ontologically independent, or ontologically self-supporting, hence the totality of ontologically concrete entities, is said by von Freytag to be "real teilbar und abtrennbar" (1961/24; cp. Whately 1859/90f.). He does not explain, however, what "real" means, since this topic belongs to the ontology of spiritual Being ("die Ontologie des geistigen Seins", 24). Consequently we are given no criterion stating the conditions that have to be fulfilled in order that something be really divisible and separable. His conception of ontological independence therefore hangs in the air, but this need not detain us from a further investigation into the logic which he defends.