In [1904] Meinong tries to demonstrate the legitimacy of his Theory of Objects as a separate science which investigates the totality of objects, regardless of whether or not they exist or subsist.¹ In this chapter I wish to give an initial exposition of some of the main tenets of his theory. In [1904] he introduces two principles which are central to the development and understanding of his Theory of Objects, and for our purposes his nonexistent objects, viz. the principles of independence and indifference. In 2.1, I will give a brief exposition of these principles. In 2.2 and 2.3, respectively, I will state my initial reaction to them. The view that all objects have being of some kind threatens to undercut these principles, and it contravenes what is usually thought to be one of Meinong"s most distinctive doctrines, viz. that there are beingless objects. Meinong"s [1904] rejection of the view that there is some (third) mode of being which can be ascribed to nonexistents will be discussed in 2.4, along with texts which indicate a flirtation with, if not acceptance of, this "damaging" view. The chapter will conclude with a section in which I will briefly discuss how Meinong differs from his historical precursors, if he indeed held that there are beingless objects. Meinong"s principle of independence, which he borrowed from his student Ernst Mally,² seems to have at least an ontological and a semantic formulation.