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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

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185303

Incompatible colours and the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy

Andrew Lugg

pp. 33-55

Abstract

Ludwig Wittgenstein's treatment of the problem of why nothing can be two colours all-over at the same time is not, as widely claimed, the Achilles heel of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). Nor was his rejection of his early explanation of the impossibility the starting point for the philosophy of Philosophical Investigations (1953). From the beginning, as the remarks in Notebooks 19141916 make clear, Wittgenstein took qualities and quantities to be mathematically representable, was of the view that points can have just one colour because of the structure of colour, and regarded mathematical impossibilities as logical impossibilities. Moreover, Wittgenstein revised his account of the impossibility of two colours occurring together subsequent to revising his conception of an elementary proposition , not the other way around. His new thinking was a consequence, not the cause, of what is regularly deemed crucial to the development of his philosophy.

Publication details

Published in:

Silva Marcos (2017) Colours in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 33-55

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56919-2_3

Full citation:

Lugg Andrew (2017) „Incompatible colours and the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy“, In: M. Silva (ed.), Colours in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 33–55.