It is possible now, on the basis of the treatment I have provided of the nature of transcendental synthesis as expounded in the only viable deduction argument and extended in the account of schematism, to return to the questions about the nature of intuition that were canvassed in Chapter 1. It will be recalled that there is a major disagreement in the current literature on Kantian intuitions concerning the priority of the two criteria that Kant offers for the notion of an "intuition" with some favouring the view that the primary criteria is that of immediacy, others that of singularity. Provisionally in Chapter 1 we leaned to the view that the singularity criteria may well be the primary one due to the paradox that Caygill pointed to around the notion of "immediacy". A further rationale for favouring the criteria of singularity in the literature generally has been that it is often taken to be the case that it is this criteria that is most important in Kant's treatment of mathematics as a body of synthetic a priori truths.¹