We can summarize the results of the first chapter now as follows: there are two fundamental problems in understanding Kant's account of cognition. These problems are: (a) how is intuition itself synthesized such that it is available for cognition at all; (b) what relationship does the synthesized unity of intuition have to the unity of concepts that Kant consistently describes as "judgment"? The citation from the Metaphysical Deduction asserts what I will from now on refer to as the class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">symmetry thesis: The symmetry thesis is that there is a basic relation between the forms of judgment and the content of empirical intuition. Our question concerning this thesis would be what enables us to suggest that this symmetry holds? What, in other words, are the grounds for it? The citation from B160-1_n by contrast suggests the following: the claim that there is a basic intuitive unity and that this unity is not brought about by concepts. However since this is a unity of pure intuition what we have to think is how it is connected to the unity of apperception (the vehicle of judgments).