The law, as commensurate with the symbolic realm, necessarily can allow no access to its own founding moment. Any sensible founding moment, any history of the law, in order to function as history, in order to come to signify anything at all, would have to be located before the emergence of law. Like the pre-subjective moment of intention on the first graph of desire, Δ, the origin of law is something which simultaneously cannot be thought within the symbolic field and cannot be thought outside of the symbolic field. Were it possible to figure it within the symbolic, it would, properly, be an aspect of the symbolic and thus could not be the necessarily exterior founding moment. However, at the same time, it is logically impossible to figure it outside the symbolic field, for outside the symbolic field nothing can be figured, represented or, to phrase the tautology in all its force, outside the field of signification nothing is signifiable. This is not, however, to suggest that the origin of law can be dismissed as impossible. The origin of law, that which can neither be attained within or symbolised outwith the symbolic with which it, law, would be commensurate, still insists. Put simply, to claim that the origin of law did not occur, to deny the origin of the law, is still to make a positive claim about the origin of law. Moreover, what is at issue here cannot be reduced to the problem of a chronological event. The search for, or postulation of, the origin of law is concerned with the grounding, the arche of law, that which would substantiate the authority of the law. It is for these reasons that any attempted aetiology of the law can only ever, and must necessarily, postulate the origin as a myth, a retroactively posited event, the veracity of which it would be impossible to ascertain beyond its status as myth.