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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

183976

Sensorimotor knowledge and the radical alternative

Victor Loughlin

pp. 105-116

Abstract

Sensorimotor theory claims that what you do and what you know how to do constitutes your visual experience. Central to the theory is the claim that such experience depends on a special kind of knowledge or understanding. I assess this commitment to knowledge in the light of three objections to the theory: the empirical implausibility objection, the learning/post-learning objection and the causal-constitutive objection. I argue that although the theory can respond to the first two objections, its commitment to know-how ultimately renders it vulnerable to the third and arguably most serious objection. I then suggest that sensorimotor theory has two options: concede the causal-constitutive objection or challenge it. I shall argue for the latter. I will claim that a radical sensorimotor theory offers the best means of responding to this objection.

Publication details

Published in:

Martin Andrew O. (2014) Contemporary sensorimotor theory. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 105-116

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-05107-9_7

Full citation:

Loughlin Victor (2014) „Sensorimotor knowledge and the radical alternative“, In: A. O. Martin (ed.), Contemporary sensorimotor theory, Dordrecht, Springer, 105–116.