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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

183624

Knowing necessary truths

Manuel Rebuschi

pp. 269-282

Abstract

How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.

Publication details

Published in:

Redmond Juan, Martins Olga Pombo, Fernández Ángel Nepomuceno (2016) Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 269-282

Full citation:

Rebuschi Manuel (2016) „Knowing necessary truths“, In: J. Redmond, O. Martins & Á. Fernández (eds.), Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction, Dordrecht, Springer, 269–282.