International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter


(2016) Consensus on Peirce's concept of habit, Dordrecht, Springer.

Thirdness as the observer observed

from habit to law by way of habitus

Göran Sonesson

pp. 283-295

In order to study the notion of habit as an instance of Thirdness in Peirce's work, it is necessary to go back to the intuitions at the basis of Peirce's categories, trying to spell out concretely, as I think this has not been done before, the meaning of the three categories. This involves entangling the notions of fallibilism and of the collaborative work of the community of scholars, which may not have been taken seriously by most scholars pursuing the Peircean tradition. It is suggested that Peirce's phenomenology is a version of Husserl's phenomenology imposing a lot of constraints on the variation in imagination. In order to make sense of habit as Thirdness, we have to extend Peircean phenomenology into Husserlean phenomenology, abandoning the language of degeneracy, which is not very enlightening. Important contributions to the study of habit has also been made by several sociologists and psychologists.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-45920-2_16

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Sonesson, G. (2016)., Thirdness as the observer observed: from habit to law by way of habitus, in M. Anderson (ed.), Consensus on Peirce's concept of habit, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 283-295.

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