Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

178752

Impossible colours

Wittgenstein and the naturalist's challenge

Andrew Lugg

pp. 107-121

Abstract

With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored. While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist's alternative.

Publication details

Published in:

Silva Marcos (2017) How colours matter to philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 107-121

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67398-1_6

Full citation:

Lugg Andrew (2017) „Impossible colours: Wittgenstein and the naturalist's challenge“, In: M. Silva (ed.), How colours matter to philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 107–121.