Tracing the phenomenological elements in Green's philosophy has brought to light aspects that have not been addressed before. I have analysed in turn Green's theories of human practice, moral action, common good, freedom and rights, and all these analyses have consistently led to one observation: Green employs two different perspectives in all of his philosophical enquiries and has, therefore, presented us with fundamental philosophical dilemmas. What is of higher priority: human perfection or human well-being in general, independently of how "well-being' is understood? What is the essence of morality: the need to make the best of ourselves and do as much good for others as we can or the need to be accepted by others the way we are (ordinary and imperfect)? Which is the more important freedom: the freedom to pursue your own vision of the good, or the freedom that is associated with the fulfilment of your duties? How do we justify rights: on the basis of human need or on the basis of social recognition? As mentioned earlier, Green's philosophy has led us to these dilemmas because he has always explored two perspectives that have not been easy to reconcile. Green has defined human practice as guided simultaneously by a "self-seeking' principle and a "self-distinguishing' principle (Chapter 1); he has defined morality as an adoption of a self-disinterested disposition, but he has also defined it as the pursuit of the unconditional good (Chapter 2); he has introduced two senses of the common good — one in the sense of moral good, one in the sense of ordinary good (Chapter 3); he has introduced two concepts of freedom, juristic and true, claiming that true freedom is more important, yet believing that juristic freedom is indispensable (Chapter 4); he argued that we have rights only to the extent that we live in a society, yet he believed that there is social prosperity only to the extent that there is personal self-fulfilment (Chapter 5).