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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

177355

Carnap's Aufbau and physicalism

what does the "mutual reducibility" of psychological and physical objects amount to?

Thomas Uebel

pp. 45-56

Abstract

The present paper is part of a larger project of investigating how far puzzling questions about Carnap's philosophical deflationism – as expressed most prominently in "Empricism, Semantics and Ontology"1 – can be answered by reference to his own preferred position in areas upon which this meta-philosophical position can be expected to have a bearing. For that project the explorations below provide a starting point; on the present occasion they will, I hope, be found to be of independent interest. At issue is the question of what makes Carnap's The Logical Structure of the World (the Aufbau) a pre-physicalist work.

Publication details

Published in:

Galavotti Maria Carla, Nemeth Elisabeth, Stadler Friedrich (2014) European philosophy of science: philosophy of science in europe and the Viennese heritage. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 45-56

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-01899-7_3

Full citation:

Uebel Thomas (2014) „Carnap's Aufbau and physicalism: what does the "mutual reducibility" of psychological and physical objects amount to?“, In: M. Galavotti, E. Nemeth & F. Stadler (eds.), European philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer, 45–56.