Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

176728

Relativity of simultaneity and eternalism

in defense of the block universe

Daniel Peterson Michael Silberstein

pp. 209-237

Abstract

Ever since Hermann Minkowski's now infamous comments in 1908 concerning the proper way to view space-time, the debate has raged as to whether or not the universe should be viewed as a four-dimensional, unified whole wherein the past, present, and future are regarded as equally real or whether the views espoused by the possibilists, historicists, and presentists regarding the unreality of the future (and, for presentists, the past) are more accurate. Now, a century after Minkowski's proposed block universe first sparked debate, we present a new, more conclusive argument in favor of the eternalism. Utilizing an argument based on the relativity of simultaneity in the tradition of Putnam and Rietdijk and explicit novel but reasonable assumptions as to the nature of reality, we argue that the past, present, and future should be treated as equally real, thus ruling that presentism and other theories of time that bestow special ontological status to the past, present, or future are untenable. Finally, we respond to our critics who suggest that: (1) there is no metaphysical difference between the positions of eternalism and presentism, (2) the present must be defined as the "here" as well as the "now", or (3) presentism is correct and physicists' current understanding of relativity is incomplete because it does not incorporate a preferred frame. We call response 1 deflationary since it purports to dissolve or deconstruct the age-old debate between the two views and response 2 compatibilist because it does nothing to alter special relativity (SR), arguing instead that SR unadorned has the resources to save presentism. Response 3 we will call incompatibilist because it adorns SR in some way in order to save presentism a la some sort of preferred frame. We show that neither 1 nor 2 can save presentism and 3 is not well motivated at this juncture except as an ad hoc device to refute eternalism.

Publication details

Published in:

Petkov Vesselin (2010) Space, time, and spacetime: physical and philosophical implications of Minkowski's unification of space and time. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 209-237

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13538-5_10

Full citation:

Peterson Daniel, Silberstein Michael (2010) „Relativity of simultaneity and eternalism: in defense of the block universe“, In: V. Petkov (ed.), Space, time, and spacetime, Dordrecht, Springer, 209–237.