Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

174579

L'impegno ontologico del pretense

Gaetano Albergo

pp. 155-177

Abstract

It is well known that, from the second year of life, children engage in imaginative activities and pretend play. Pretending is changing the nature of perceptual inputs at will. In this paper I shall take up the question of young children’s knowledge about the pretend-real distinctions. According to Josef Perner, they have an immature concept, called prelief, because they do not differentiate between believing and pretending. But, we know that belief and pretense have different inputs. Imagination is at the whim of our intentions, belief not. And, on the side of outputs, when children pretend, they carry out behavioral sequences “as if” they really had beliefs, but belief and pretense have different causal roles in action tendencies. So, when a boy pretends, he acts out his pretense within the scope of a supposition, but, why doesn’t he go all the way? That is, how are we to explain the limits children place on their activity? I shall answer these questions arguing that pretense is tied to conceptual knowledge. This will enable me to give a metaphysical account of this phenomenon, because it is based on the intentional manipulation of the identity of things and their properties.

Publication details

Published in:

(2013) Nuove teorie dell'immaginazione. Rivista di estetica 53.

Pages: 155-177

DOI: 10.4000/estetica.1574

Full citation:

Albergo Gaetano (2013) „L'impegno ontologico del pretense“. Rivista di estetica 53, 155–177.