Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

174544

Meta-institutional concepts

a new category for social ontology

Giuseppe Lorini

pp. 127-139

Abstract

In Speech Acts, John Searle argues that institutional facts presuppose, for their existence, the existence of certain institutions (understood as systems of constitutive rules). In this paper I extend Searle’s theory of institutional facts arguing that a further level is needed for the investigation of the structure of institutional reality: the level of meta-institutional concepts. The meta-institutional concepts are concepts that go beyond (Greek: metá) the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility. An example of meta-institutional concept is the concept of game. In a culture which does not have the concept of game, we could move the chess-men according to the rules of chess, we could also perform a castling, but it would be impossible to play chess.

Publication details

Published in:

(2014) The other(s). Rivista di estetica 56.

Pages: 127-139

DOI: 10.4000/estetica.876

Full citation:

Lorini Giuseppe (2014) „Meta-institutional concepts: a new category for social ontology“. Rivista di estetica 56, 127–139.