Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

167101

Who's calling Wittgenstein a pragmatist?

Judy M. Hensley

pp. n/a

Abstract

In this paper, I focus on the debate that surrounds “pragmatic” interpretations of Ludwig Wittgenstein. By this, I mean the debate between those who read Wittgenstein as a pragmatist or as having pragmatic affinities and those who object to this reading.In particular, drawing on Hilary Putnam’s lecture “Was Wittgenstein a Pragmatist?” and Stanley Cavell’s response “What’s the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?,” I will spell out the similarities seen between Wittgenstein and pragmatism as well as the divergences emphasized between the two. I will argue that the teasing out of the similarities and the teasing out of the differences is important to a) having a clearer understanding of both Wittgenstein and pragmatism; b) showing elements that make twentieth century philosophy unique; and c) shedding light on where philosophy is now, what issues and questions are being raised, and what possible solutions and answers are being offered.

Publication details

Published in:

(2012) Wittgenstein and pragmatism. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2).

DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.716

Full citation:

Hensley Judy M. (2012) „Who's calling Wittgenstein a pragmatist?“. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 4 (2), n/a.