Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

150491

The problem of definitiveness in experience

Edmund Husserl

pp. 145-161

Abstract

That we have a consciousness of our own life as a life endlessly streaming along; that we continually have an experiencing consciousness in this life, but in connection to this in the widest 30 parameters, an emptily presenting consciousness of an environing-world—this is the accomplishment of unity out of manifold, multifariously changing intentions, intuitive and non-intuitive intentions that are nonetheless concordant with one another:intentions that in their particularity coalesce to form concrete syntheses again and again. But these complex syntheses cannot remain isolated. All particular syntheses, through which things in perception, in memory, etc., are given, are surrounded by a general

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (2001) Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis: Lectures on transcendental logic. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 145-161

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-0846-4_18

Full citation:

Husserl Edmund (2001) The problem of definitiveness in experience, In: Analyses concerning passive and active synthesis, Dordrecht, Springer, 145–161.