We have seen in the last chapter that a phenomenological understanding of truth effectively undercuts the extreme skepticism engendered by Cartesian objectivism, a skepticism which holds any rational justification of belief to be impossible. However, in the absence of a further demonstration that at least some Evidenz is absolute, Husserl's theory of truth remains compatible with a more moderate skepticism, one according to which all our beliefs are or might be false, even if rationally justified to some limited degree. Moreover, this potential weakness of Husserl's analysis in relation to skepticism will necessarily weaken it in relation to relativism as well. For unlike a formal approach (which, as we saw in Chapter One, can show only that relativism is inconsistent, and not that relativism's opposite is correct), a positive overcoming of relativism requires a justification of the possibility of knowledge of non-relative truth. This in turn presupposes a justification of the possibility of knowledge as such. Thus any positive overcoming of relativism can be no stronger than the overcoming of skepticism which supports it.