Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

148691

Object, positum, concept

Gustav Špet

pp. 97-121

Abstract

The dissatisfaction and discontent observed in contemporary philosophy concerning knowledge expressed in terms of and by means of concepts springs chiefly from the fact that concepts, as a means of cognizing, appear to be determinate. Consequently, that is, they appear as limited. This is not a contingency, a temporary deficiency. It is our only, and so necessary, way of making a concept "logical."

Publication details

Published in:

Špet Gustav (1991) Appearance and sense: Phenomenology as the fundamental science and its problems. Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer.

Pages: 97-121

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3292-3_6

Full citation:

Špet Gustav (1991) Object, positum, concept, In: Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer, 97–121.