In this paper I claim that the individualizing role that Heidegger assigned to "anxiety' reveals his attempt to resolve a fundamental problem related to Husserl's transcendental "I.' I show that Husserl's problem consists in the impossibility of distinguishing between the individual essence of a particular pure ego and the eidos "pure ego' on the basis of the available phenomenological procedures. I suggest that anxiety, attests to this failure. Yet in contrast to the pure "I,' anxiety is not a representation of a self. Rather, it is a practical mode of self-awareness rooted in care that uncovers one's own authentic ability-to-be. Nevertheless, I clarify why, given the conceptual background that Husserl and Heidegger share, the appeal to anxiety and authentic ability-to-be cannot escape the need to posit a representation of the self that has features similar to those of the pure "I.'