Recent years have seen a resurgence in work on Edith Stein's theories of empathy (Jardine, Human Studies 38(4): 567–589, 2015; Moran, The problem of empathy: Lipps, Scheler, Husserl and Stein. In: Kelly T, Rosemann P (eds) Amor amicitiae, on the love that is friendship: essays in medieval thought and beyond in honor of the Rev. Professor James McEvoy. Peeters, Leuven/Dudley, pp. 269–312, 2004; Szanto, Human Studies 38(4):503–527, 2015; Taipale, Human Studies 38 (4):463–479, 2015; Vendrell Ferran, Human Studies 38(4):481–502, 2015; Zahavi, Inquiry 53(3):285–306, 2010) and of community and collective intentionality (Burns, Studies 38(4):529–547, 2015; Caminada, Human Studies 38(4):549–566, 2015; Calcagno, Lived experience from the inside out: social and political philosophy in Edith Stein. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, 2014). Notably absent, however, is an account of the relationship between empathy and community. This chapter begins the work of making this relationship explicit. This can be of at least two-fold service to future research. First, it will show the conceptual richness and complexity of Stein's theory of empathy, demonstrating that it cannot be confined to the theory-of-mind debate between simulation theorists, theory-theorists, and advocates of a direct perception model. Second, it may also serve to orient future research into collective intentionality by elucidating her original theory of communal experience. After establishing Steinian accounts of empathy and communal experience, I argue that empathy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for community.