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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Series | Book | Chapter

146554

Interpreting intuitions

Marcus McGahhey Neil van Leeuwen

pp. 73-98

Abstract

We argue that many intuitions do not have conscious propositional contents. In particular, many of the intuitions had in response to philosophical thought experiments, like Gettier cases, do not have such contents. They are more like hunches, urgings, murky feelings, and twinges. Our view thus goes against the received view of intuitions in philosophy, which we call Mainstream Propositionalism. Our positive view is that many thought-experimental intuitions are conscious, spontaneous, non-theoretical, non-propositional psychological states that often motivate belief revision, but they require interpretation, in light of background beliefs, before a subject can form a propositional judgment as a consequence of them. We call our view Interpretationalism. We argue (i) that Interpretationalism avoids the problems that beset Mainstream Propositionalism and (ii) that our view meshes well with contemporary cognitive science.

Publication details

Published in:

Pedrini Patrizia, Kirsch Julie (2018) Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative. Dordrecht, Springer.

Pages: 73-98

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-98646-3_5

Full citation:

McGahhey Marcus, van Leeuwen Neil (2018) „Interpreting intuitions“, In: P. Pedrini & J. Kirsch (eds.), Third-person self-knowledge, self-interpretation, and narrative, Dordrecht, Springer, 73–98.