Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity
The neurological discovery of mirror neurons is of eminent importance for the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity. G. Rizzolatti and V. Gallese found in experiments with primates that a set of neurons in the premotor cortex represents the visually registered movements of another animal. The activity of these mirror neurons presents exactly the same pattern of activity as appears in the movement of one's own body. These findings may be extended to other cognitive and emotive functions in humans. I show how these neurological findings might be "translated" phenomenologically into our own experienced sensations, feelings and volitions.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Lohmar, D. (2006). Mirror neurons and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1), pp. 5-16.
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