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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

143199

The anachronism of moral individualism and the responsibility of extended agency

F. Allan Hanson

pp. 415-424

Abstract

Recent social theory has departed from methodological individualism's explanation of action according to the motives and dispositions of human individuals in favor of explanation in terms of broader agencies consisting of both human and nonhuman elements described as cyborgs, actor-networks, extended agencies, or distributed cognition. This paper proposes that moral responsibility for action also be vested in extended agencies. It advances a consequentialist view of responsibility that takes moral responsibility to be a species of causal responsibility, and it answers objections that might be raised on the basis of intentions and deserts.

Publication details

Published in:

Selinger Evan (2008) Affect, agency, intentionality, and responsibility. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3).

Pages: 415-424

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-008-9098-y

Full citation:

Hanson F Allan (2008) „The anachronism of moral individualism and the responsibility of extended agency“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (3), 415–424.