The phenomenology of propositional attitudes
Propositional attitudes are often classified as non-phenomenal mental states. I argue that there is no good reason for doing so. The unwillingness to view propositional attitudes as being essentially phenomenal stems from a biased notion of phenomenality, from not paying sufficient attention to the idioms in which propositional attitudes are usually reported, from overlooking the considerable degree to which different intentional modes can be said to be phenomenologically continuous, and from not considering the possibility that propositional attitudes may be transparent, just like sensations and emotions are commonly held to be: there may be no appropriate way of describing their phenomenal character apart from describing the properties and objects they represent.
(2008). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
Klausen Søren (2008). The phenomenology of propositional attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4), pp. 445-462.