Hallucinations for disjunctivists
In this paper, I examine the so-called disjunctive views on hallucinations. I argue that neither of the options open to the disjunctivist is capable of accommodating basic phenomenological facts about hallucinatory experiences and the explanatory demands behind the classical argument from hallucination. A positive characterization of the hallucinatory case is not attractive to a disjunctivist once she is disposed to accept certain commonalities with veridical experiences. Negative disjunctivism glosses the hallucinatory disjunct in terms of indiscriminability. I will argue that this move either renounces to characterize phenomenally the hallucinatory experience or does not take seriously questions about why indiscriminability is possible in the phenomenal realm.
González Juan C. (2010). Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2).
Vega-Encabo Jesús (2010). Hallucinations for disjunctivists. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2), pp. 281-293.