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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

142892

Actual and non-actual motion

why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)

Johan BlombergJordan Zlatev

pp. 395-418

Abstract

Experientialist semantics has contributed to a broader notion of linguistic meaning by emphasizing notions such as construal, perspective, metaphor, and embodiment, but has suffered from an individualist concept of meaning and has conflated experiential motivations with conventional semantics. We argue that these problems can be redressed by methods and concepts from phenomenology, on the basis of a case study of sentences of non-actual motion such as "The mountain range goes all the way from Mexico to Canada." Through a phenomenological reanalysis of proposals of Talmy, Langacker, and Matlock, we show that non-actual motion is both experientially and linguistically non-unitary. At least three different features of human consciousness—enactive perception, visual scanning, and imagination—constitute experiential motivations for non-actual motion sentences, and each of these could be related to phenomenological analyses of human intentionality. The second problem is addressed by proposing that the experiential motivations of non-actual motion sentences can be viewed as sedimented through "passive" processes of acquisition and social transmission and that this implies an interactive loop between experience and language, yielding losses in terms of original experience, but gains in terms of communal signification. Something that is underestimated by phenomenology is that what is sedimented are not only intentional objects such as states of affairs, but aspects of how they are given, i.e., the original, temporal, bodily experiences themselves. Since cognitive semantics has emphasized such aspects of meaning, we suggest that phenomenology can itself benefit from experientialist semantics, especially when it turns its focus from prepredicative to predicative, linguistic intentionality.

Publication details

Published in:

(2014) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3).

Pages: 395-418

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-013-9299-x

Full citation:

Blomberg Johan, Zlatev Jordan (2014) „Actual and non-actual motion: why experientialist semantics needs phenomenology (and vice versa)“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3), 395–418.