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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

142828

Joint action and recursive consciousness of consciousness

Sebastian Rödl

pp. 769-779

Abstract

In a series of essays, Bratman defines a concept, which we may call the concept of Bratmanian action by many. Our discussion of this concept, in section 1, reveals that it is not the one called to mind by the usual examples of joint action. Section 2 lays alongside it a different concept of doing something together. According to it, many are doing A together if and only if the principle of the actions in which they are doing A is a joint intention to do A, an act of intending that is theirs. It seems fitting to call this joint intentional action. In distinction to Bratmanian action by many, joint intentional action is ubiquitous in human life. This raises the question what may be the interest of Bratman's concept. Its interest can reside only in a relation it bears to the concept of joint intentional action. Section 3 discusses the suggestion that Bratmanian action by many is a precursor of joint action in human phylogenesis. This is wrong because subjects are capable of Bratmanian action only in virtue of being subjects of joint action.

Publication details

Published in:

Satne Glenda (2015) Developmental, comparative and conceptual issues. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4).

Pages: 769-779

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-015-9423-1

Full citation:

Rödl Sebastian (2015) „Joint action and recursive consciousness of consciousness“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4), 769–779.