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International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

142713

Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception

David Silverman

pp. 157-173

Abstract

The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience claims that perception is constituted by bodily interaction with the environment, drawing on practical knowledge of the systematic ways that sensory inputs are disposed to change as a result of movement. Despite the theory's associations with enactivism, it is sometimes claimed that the appeal to "knowledge' means that the theory is committed to giving an essential theoretical role to internal representation, and therefore to a form of orthodox cognitive science. This paper defends the role ascribed to knowledge by the theory, but argues that this knowledge can and should be identified with bodily skill rather than representation. Making the further argument that the notion of "representation hunger' can be replaced with "prima facie representation hunger', it concludes that although the theory could optionally be developed scientifically in part by reference to internal representation, it makes a strong and natural fit with anti-representationalist embodied or enactive cognitive science.

Publication details

Published in:

(2018) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1).

Pages: 157-173

DOI: 10.1007/s11097-017-9503-5

Full citation:

Silverman David (2018) „Bodily skill and internal representation in sensorimotor perception“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (1), 157–173.