Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Journal | Volume | Article

142159

Affectively driven perception

toward a non-representational phenomenology

Matt Bower

pp. 225-245

Abstract

While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl's work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the phenomenal character of low-level perception. What these representations are called on to explain, i.e., the phenomenal character of perceiving objects in their full presence, can be more parsimoniously explained by appealing to certain affective states or affect schemas that shape the intentional directedness of low-level perceptual experience and define its phenomenal character in a non-representational way. This revision of the Husserlian view, it is shown, also helps us understand the normative character of perception.

Publication details

Published in:

(2014) Husserl Studies 30 (3).

Pages: 225-245

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-014-9152-2

Full citation:

Bower Matt (2014) „Affectively driven perception: toward a non-representational phenomenology“. Husserl Studies 30 (3), 225–245.