Recognition and intersubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy
Very often, it is misunderstood what Hegel means by the relation of recognition between self-consciousnesses. Axel Honneth, for example, assumes that the self-consciousness has to be understood as a concrete individual, and he thinks that the recognition between self-consciousnesses thus concerns concrete individuals. In this contribution, I argue that the self-consciousness is a theoretical construction that serves, admittedly, the comprehension of the concrete individual, but at the same time, needs to be sharply distinguished from the concrete individual. The relation of recognition has nothing to do with the intersubjective relation, in which concrete individuals try to articulate their unique subjectivity to one another in an adequate manner.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Cobben, P. (2017). Recognition and intersubjectivity in Hegel's philosophy. Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy 5 (1), pp. 17-44.
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