Metodo

International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy

Book | Chapter

121398

Abstract

The chapter is taken up by a presentation and assessment of different versions of what might be termed the anonymity objection. One version of the objection defends the idea of mindless coping and argues that consciousness on the pre-reflective level is so completely and fully immersed in the world that it remains oblivious of itself. Another version denies that one is ever directly acquainted with one’s own experiences, not only pre-reflectively but also when engaged in reflection or introspection. According to those who defend the transparency thesis, phenomenal consciousness is strictly and exclusively world-presenting. Having replied to both these objections, the chapter ends with a discussion of whether neuro- and psychopathology might present us with relevant exceptions to the claim that experiential episodes are first-personal, that is, with cases of self-disorders featuring anonymous experiences that altogether lack mineness and for-me-ness.

Publication details

Published in:

Zahavi Dan (2014) Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Pages: 25-41


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DOI:

Full citation:

Zahavi Dan (2014) Transparency and anonymity, In: Self and other, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 25–41.